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* *-pr c i ^ O o n i a n t s c o n s t i t . u t i c n a 
• . d e . 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code of C r i m i '. Prccedu 
"A peace officer n tay stop ar iy persoi i ii I 
a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicioi i to believe that he has cominitted 
or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and 
may denial id his name, address and an 
e x p I a n a t i o i i o f 1 i i s a c t i o n s . " 
T h e C on s 111 u t ion o f U t ah , A r t i c1e 1, § 1 4 : 
'The :"i:::n e. '.:. p : o p i to be secure in 
their p e r s o n s , h o u s e s , papers 'iiid effects 
aga iust unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause suppcrt.ee by 
cat:: or affirmation, particularly describing 
:he u1 FiCC to be ^arched and the person or 
:hinc to be seized." 
.ahts 
I ,!1 i< ; d n * e n t 1: ( ) 111 e C o i i s t :i t I :i t :i o i :s o f 11 i e II i i :il t e d 
States: 
"The right of the people + r be secure ':. 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated and no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable 'v-uso supported by 
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oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized," 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 29, 1985, the defendants were charged with 
possession of controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to 
distribute for value. 
On June 5, 1985, the defendants appeared with counsel for 
arraignment in the District Court and filed a motion to suppress 
evidence. 
In a pre-trial hearing in the District Court on July 10, 
1985, the court granted defendant's motion to suppress all 
evidence surrounding the discovery of marijuana in the defendant 
Carpena's vehicle. This ruling was based on evidence of a 
violation of defendant's constitutional rights by an illegal 
seizure and subsequent search of the defendants and their 
vehicle. The charges against the defendants were subsequently 
dismissed on the basis that the state had no further evidence to 
support the charge. The plaintiff is appealing the ruling of the 
District Court on the suppression of this evidence. 
STATEMENT OF TJIF FACTS 
In November of 1985, Les Daroczi, attorney for the state 
submitted an agreed statement as the record on appeal, pursuant 
to Rule 11(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
statement was signed by attorneys for all parties involved and 
was signed by the Honorable David E. Roth, District Court Judge, 
who decided this case. This agreed statement of record on appeal 
is as follows: 
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While patrolling around 3:00 a.m. in a neighborhood which 
had a rash of recent burglaries, the police sergeant in charge of 
the shift spotted defendant's vehicle proceeding at a slow pace. 
The vehicle had an Arizona license. Sgt. Malmborg followed said 
vehicle for three blocks, then turned on his red lights. No 
criminal or traffic offense was observed up to this point, nor 
had there been a report to the police of a vehicle burglary prior 
to the stop. The three occupants of said vehicle began moving 
about and kept looking around, then slowly pulled into a driveway 
of one of the occupant's residence. This investigative stop led 
to the discovery of a large quantity of marijuana (approximately 
30 pounds) in said vehicle. 
The defendants, in a pretrial hearing, moved to suppress the 
marijuana. The court granted the motion, ruling there was no 
reason to stop said vehicle. 
In plaintiff's brief, there were references made which went 
beyond the scope of the agreed statement of record on appeal. 
Although there is no record submitted to the Supreme Court with 
this evidence, these additional statements must be clarified. 
After the two defendants and another individual who was in 
the vehicle were stopped by the police in the driveway of this 
other individual's residence, the police officer ordered the 
individuals out of the car and the car was immediately searched. 
During the course of this search, an unloaded pistol was 
discovered under the driver's seat of the vehicle. The officer 
who found this pistol recognized that it was unloaded and the 
fact that it was there was no violation of the law. The officer 
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then took the keys out of the ignition without permission and on 
his way back to the trunk of the vehicle made a quick remark of 
inquiry as to the ownership of the vehicle. Without hesitation, 
the officer commenced to open the trunkf at which point, 
defendant Carpena stated, "I don't think I want you to do that." 




EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE SEARCH OF THE 
DEFENDANTS CAR SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED SINCE 
THE EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF 
THE DEFENDANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER 
THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States guarantees that an individual will not be subjected to 
unreasonable searches and seizures. This guarantee extends net 
only to the individual, but to his residence, his private effects 
and his automobile. The reasoning behind such a guarantee is 
articulated by the Supreme Court in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S.I, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 LEd.2d 889 (1968), where the 
court stated: 
"It must be recognized that whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away he has 'seized1 that 
person, and it is nothing less than sheer 
torture of the English language to suggest 
that a careful exploration of the outer 
surfaces of a person's clothing all 
over his or her body in an attempt to 
find weapons is not a 'search1. Moreover, 
it is simply fantastic to urge that such a 
procedure performed in public by a policeman 
while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps 
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facing a wall with is hands raised, is a 
'petty indignity'. It is a serious intrusion 
upon the sanctity of the person, which may 
inflict great indignity and arouse strong 
resentment, and it is not to be taken 
lightly." 
Although the Supreme Court has somewhat expanded the 
probably cause requirements for a seizure of an individual in 
Terry v. Ohio, the Fourth Amendment still operates to restrict 
the conduct of police officers to a very limited class of cases 
in which the probable cause standard may be circumvented. 
The court in Terry v. Ohio he]d that there must be a 
"narrowly drawn authority" to permit searches of individuals 
absent probable cause for arrest. The court further held, 
"In determining whether the officer acted 
reasonably in such circumstances, due 
weight must be given not to his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch1, but to 
the specific inferences which he is entitled 
to draw from facts in light of his experience." 
(Id at 27, emphasis added) 
Numerous courts have applied this "reasonable suspicion" 
test to various situations in a determination of whether or not 
an individual's rights have been infringed upon. The Supreme 
Court in the case of Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 75 LEd.2d 
229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) was presented with a situation where 
two detectives detained and searched an individual at an airport 
who fit a drug courier profile. The facts revealed that a 
nervous individual had purchased, with cash, a ticket under an 
assumed name and was carryinq two heavy suitcases. The detective 
stopped and searched the individual and, with his consent, 
searched his bags. The Supreme Court affirmed a decision 
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exciuding all evidence obtained by this tainted search. In it's 
decision, the Court held, "He (the defendant) may not be 
detained, even momentarily, without reasonable, objective grounds 
for doing so, and his refusal to listen or answer does not, 
without more, furnish those grounds." (Ijd at 498) 
In the present case, Officer Malmborg's only grounds for 
stopping defendants were, by his own testimony, because they were 
driving slowly, it was late at night, there were three male 
occupants and the license plates on the vehicles were from out of 
state. 
The state, in it's brief of appellant, improperly relied 
upon the case of United States v. Sharp, 470 U.S. , 84 
LEd.2d 605, 106 S.Ct. (1985) as dispositive of this issue 
and therefore directly controlling the case at hand. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Sharp summarily affirmed the lower court's 
ruling on the initial stop and then spent the bulk of it's 
decision deciding another issue concerning the permissable length 
of post-stop detention. (Icl at 613.) 
The facts supporting the Supreme Court's affirmation of the 
lower court's decision concerning the initial stop were a great 
deal more substantial than those present in the case at hand. In 
addition to those cited in the appellant's brief, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
"Cook's (the officer) suspicions were 
sufficiently aroused to follow the two 
vehicles for approximately 20 miles as 
they proceeded south into South Carolina. 
He then decided to make an 'investigative 
stop' and radioed the state highway 
patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher 
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driving a marked patrol car responded to 
the call. Almost immediately after Thrasher 
caught up with the procession, the Pontiac 
and a pick-up turned off the highway and 
onto a campground road. Cook and Thrasher 
followed the two vehicles as the latter 
drove along the road at 55 to 60 mph, 
exceeding the speed limit of 35 mph. The 
road eventually looped back to the highway 
which Savage and Sharp turned and continued 
to drive south. At this point, all four 
vehicles were in the middle lane of three 
right hand lanes of the highway. Agent Cook 
asked Officer Thrasher to signal both vehicles 
to stop. Thrasher pulled along side the Pontiac, 
which was in the lead, turned on his flashing 
light and motioned for the driver the of the 
Pontiac to stop. As Sharp moved the Pontiac 
into the right lane, the pick-up truck cut 
between the Pontiac and Thrasher!s patrol car, 
nearly hitting the patrol car and continued 
down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck 
while Cook pulled up behind the Pontiac." 
(Id at 610) 
Viewing the above cited facts, we can see the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court in summarily affirming the Court of Appeals 
finding of reasonable suspicion. Not only was there reasonable 
suspicion in that case, but there was an actual violation of a 
number of traffic offenses long before the officers turned on 
their overhead lights in an attempt to stop the offending 
vehicles. 
Finally, the Supreme Court in the case of Sharp was 
upholding the exercise of discretion by the trial court which 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has likewise expressed it's 
reluctance in reversing a trial court's decision as to 
admissibility of evidence. Most recently, in the case of State 
v. Gallegos, Supreme Court number 20349, 23 Utah Advance Report, 
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23, December 9, 1985, (filed November ?9, 1985), the Court stated 
"At the outset it is important to note that this court will not 
disturb the ruling of the trial court in questions of 
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error." (Ld at 24) 
The facts in the present case clearly support the ruling of 
the District Court. The crucial point of this entire scenario is 
the moment that the officer detained the defendants by pulling 
them over and ordering them out of the car. There was no 
indication that they had committed any crime. At the moment the 
officer turned on his overhead light to signal the defendants to 
stop, his "reasonable suspicion" consisted of a car licensed in 
the State of Arizona containing three Mexican occupants 
proceeding at a relatively slow pace at 3:00 a.m. These facts, 
taken together, do not arise to the reasonable suspicion standard 
required in Terry v. Ohio, and Florida v. Royer. It is at this 
point the officer's actions were clearly in violation of the 
defendantf s rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Officer Malmborg had no right to detain these people even 
momentarily, and he violated their constitutional rights by 
subjecting then to a seizure of their persons and a search of 
their vehicle. Any evidence resulting from this stop should be 
suppressed and excluded as "fruit of a poison tree." 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ T X _ d aY o f Dodentodr,/198 5.y 
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